Sunday, 28 June 2026

Does Transport for London Have Too Much Power in Decision-Making?

Public transport forms part of our critical national infrastructure, serving as a vital asset to both the economy and society. With a significant portion of the population unable to drive a car due to factors such as age, financial hardship, disability, underlying health conditions, or legal restrictions like criminal convictions, a well-functioning transport network is a necessity rather than a luxury.

The purpose of this article is not to disparage Transport for London (TfL), but rather to examine whether the current legislative framework provides sufficient accountability for TfL's decision-making. As a major public body, TfL must remain strictly accountable to the public, operating under the Nolan Principles of public life, which mandate objectivity, accountability, and openness.

How TfL is Governed

TfL is a statutory body established by the Greater London Authority (GLA) Act 1999, which mandates the Mayor of London to develop policies for safe, integrated, and efficient transport services. TfL’s structural hierarchy and decision-making processes are regulated by standing orders, the Scheme of Delegation, and a dedicated code of corporate governance that is intended to reflect the Nolan Principles of public life. Transparency is maintained through the Local Government Act (LGA) 1972, which governs Board, committee, and advisory panel meetings. These sessions are advertised via public notices, streamed live on TfL's YouTube channel, and supplemented by publicly accessible meeting papers published five clear working days in advance. Details regarding Mayoral directions, board member remuneration, and biographies are fully accessible online.

To satisfy specific statutory requirements, TfL operates various activities through limited liability subsidiary companies or partnerships, primarily incorporated under the Companies Act 2006. The organisation has three direct subsidiaries: TfL Trustee Company Limited, London Transport Insurance (Guernsey) Limited, and Transport Trading Limited (TTL). While the insurance arm is registered in Guernsey, the remaining entities are registered in England and Wales. Comprehensive details, financial accounts, and independent advisory structures like the Independent Investment Programme Advisory Group (IIPAG) are managed through this central corporate framework.

As a principal holding company, TTL oversees a vast portfolio of specialised subsidiaries categorised by their operational functions. These include key infrastructure managers and service operators across London Underground, London Buses, London Rail (including the Elizabeth line and Docklands Light Railway), and river and coach services. Additionally, TTL manages corporate financial transactions through Transport for London Finance Limited and directs extensive property investments via Places for London Limited, which controls numerous dedicated property development subsidiaries across the capital. A complete directory of these structural entities is available on the official subsidiary index.

Strategic Transport Powers of the Mayor

Under the Greater London Authority Act 1999, the Mayor of London is granted extensive statutory powers to control and shape the region's transport framework. The Mayor is legally tasked with a general transport duty under Section 141 to develop and implement comprehensive policies that promote safe, integrated, efficient, and economic transport services—including pedestrian and freight provisions—to, from, and within Greater London. To execute this duty, Section 142 mandates that the Mayor prepare, publish, and routinely review a formal "transport strategy" that accommodates individuals with mobility issues, which must align with national policies under Section 143 to prevent the Secretary of State from intervening.

The Act equips the Mayor with statutory powers over local government; under Sections 145 to 153, the Mayor possesses the exclusive authority to approve or reject the Local Implementation Plans (LIPs) of London borough councils, issue legally binding directions, and even draft or execute transport plans on a council's behalf at their expense in cases of non-compliance. Furthermore, the Mayor holds total executive control over TfL, maintaining the power under Section 154 to appoint its corporate members and designate the chairperson, whilst Section 155 grants the Mayor explicit authority to issue overriding, legally binding written guidance or specific operational directions to govern how TfL executes its functions.

TfL's Commitment to Transparency and the Gaps in Corporate Scheduling

TfL explicitly states that transparency is vital for building trust with stakeholders, fostering responsible decision-making, and ensuring public accountability. To deliver on this commitment, the organisation aims to provide everyone with the information needed to understand how it is running London’s transport network and spending public money. In line with this, TfL maintains a proactive Publications Schedule to outline when essential documents—such as Board papers, financial accounts, and major contracts—will be made available to the public.

However, a closer look at this schedule reveals a noticeable discrepancy between TfL's broad transparency goals and its tracking of specific operational meetings. While formal governance structures like the main TfL Board and the Customer, Sustainability & Operations Panel have rigid rules requiring papers to be published five working days before a meeting, other specialised groups—such as Bus Services Meetings—are entirely absent from the official corporate calendar. This omission may make it more difficult for stakeholders to follow the decision-making process behind local transport changes.

Despite leaving these specific meetings off the schedule, TfL does systematically release a vast amount of underlying bus network data outside a traditional meeting-minute format. The schedule highlights that the public can access four-weekly bus speed updates, quarterly safety dashboards, and annual route-by-route passenger boarding figures. For data or meeting minutes not proactively published on these schedules, the public must rely on TfL's broader Freedom of Information (FOI) policy, under which individual replies are published within a month of being sent.

Hidden Price Increases

Although the overarching structure of fares and tickets for TfL services remains subject to the Mayor’s explicit approval in accordance with Section 174 of the Greater London Authority (GLA) Act 1999, some discretionary charges can be amended through TfL's delegated authority without requiring the same level of public approval as the wider fares structure. A document published on TfL's official Freedom of Information (FOI) disclosure log reveals that TfL holds the executive authority to alter discretionary fees and charges independently to recover operational costs and offset inflation.

Under this delegated framework, TfL approved increases to the price of standard blue Oyster cards, rising from £10.00 to £10.50 effective 1 March 2026, and Visitor Oysters, which similarly increase to £10.50 effective 1 April 2026. This administrative power also covers increased application fees across various Oyster concessions introduced on 1 April 2026. Notably, this includes the 18+ Student Oyster photocard fee rising from £21 to £22, alongside a significant jump in the annual university registration fee from £25 to £45, as well as subsequent hikes for the 60+ and Zip cards. These figures illustrate how certain discretionary charges can change independently of the annual fares process. I discussed this issue previously in an article examining Oyster card fees.

This trend mirrors previous unannounced adjustments. For example, from 7 September 2025, the base price of a new standard Oyster card or a Visitor Oyster card increased from £7 to £10. While the change appeared in official documentation, it did not receive the same level of publicity as the annual fare announcements or a wider press campaign.

It also follows a longer pattern of phasing out traditional ticketing options through internal administrative decisions. In September 2023, TfL withdrew station platform tickets from sale across the London Underground, London Overground and the Elizabeth line. More recently, in March 2025, TfL withdrew the paper "One Day Bus & Tram Pass" from Tube and railway stations. As with some other administrative changes, this decision was implemented without a public consultation.

Under Chapter IV of Part IV of the Greater London Authority Act 1999, TfL is explicitly empowered by Section 173 to directly provide or enter into binding agreements with third parties to secure public passenger transport services, granting it total control over revenue pooling, fares, routes, and operational frequencies. Section 174 places a statutory duty on the Mayor to determine the general structure and level of fares, charges, and overall network frequencies. Sections 175 and 176 legally mandate mutual co-operation, data sharing, and cross-network co-ordination between TfL, the Secretary of State, and private transport providers.

While this framework originally required extensive consultation over traditional rail franchising, it now operates in a modernised context where legacy franchised railways are winding down as services transition under Great British Railways (GBR). Furthermore, Section 177 permits London borough councils and the Common Council to enter into direct agreements with TfL or rail operators to fund additional localised services or facilities, while Section 178 mandates that TfL publish its fares and annually inform local authorities, surrounding county councils, and London TravelWatch of its plans. Crucially, this statutory text contains no statutory requirement for TfL to hold a public consultation before implementing these wider transport plans. This layout contrasts sharply with administrative policy in other sectors, where TfL does routinely run formal public consultations when dealing with black taxi fare increase proposals to gather passenger and trade feedback before adjusting tariffs.

Road User Charging and Consultation

This policy framework also applies to major road user charging schemes, such as the Congestion Charge and Ultra Low Emission Zone (ULEZ) expansions. Under Schedule 23 of the Greater London Authority Act 1999, the Mayor and TfL hold the statutory power to implement and vary these initiatives through formal charging orders.

While Schedule 23 mandates a public consultation before changes are confirmed, debates often arise regarding how public feedback influences final policy outcomes. During the outer London ULEZ expansion, for instance, TfL proceeded with the implementation after concluding that the environmental and public health benefits outweighed the documented economic impacts and localized opposition raised in the consultation responses. Because the legislative framework requires TfL to demonstrate procedural compliance and due regard to feedback rather than securing public consensus, critics argue the process offers limited democratic recourse for opposing viewpoints, frequently leaving judicial review as the primary avenue for formal challenge.

Proposed Bus Service Changes

A key area of governance concern is how TfL considers responses to public consultations on changes to the surface transport network. In several cases, official consultation reports acknowledge that proposed route changes are likely to have a measurable negative impact on some passengers. Nevertheless, TfL has proceeded with modified or original proposals despite significant opposition expressed during the consultation process.

Transport for London’s consultation report confirms revised changes to routes 19 and 38 and new route 10. Despite opposition, the plans will proceed with adjustments, including extending route 10 to Newington Green and improving N38 operating hours. haveyoursay.tfl.gov.uk/bus-routes-1...

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— CLondoner92 (@clondoner92.bsky.social) June 26, 2026 at 11:25 AM


#TfL Have Your Say: Proposed changes to bus routes 30 and 205: Withdraw route 30 between Marble Arch to Euston Withdraw route 205 between Paddington to Baker Street and extend to Marble Arch More journeys for route 27 Consultation closes at 2 December 2024 haveyoursay.tfl.gov.uk/30-205-bus-p...

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— CLondoner92 (@clondoner92.bsky.social) October 22, 2024 at 9:39 AM

Under the Greater London Authority Act 1999, TfL is legally required to determine and review which local bus services are necessary to deliver a safe, integrated, efficient, and economic transport network across Greater London. This designated collection of routes is officially known as the London bus network, and TfL is tasked with securing its provision as far as reasonably practicable. Operation of this network is strictly controlled and can only be run directly by TfL, its subsidiaries, or private operators who have entered into a formal "London local service agreement" and hold a valid PSV operator's licence or community bus permit.

The Act mandates that before TfL can make any final decisions to add, significantly vary, or discontinue a network service, it must undergo a statutory consultation regarding routes, stopping places, and terminal points with the affected London borough councils, the Metropolitan and City of London police commissioners, and London TravelWatch.

This pattern of pushing through structural adjustments despite public backlash has deep historical roots. Before the establishment of TfL, the capital's bus network operated under government-controlled tendering by London Regional Transport (LRT), which pressed ahead with a highly controversial restructuring of the Hackney bus network in early 1990. Despite intense local pushback and warnings over job security, LRT went ahead with major operational changes that directly carved up and reallocated key services, including major adjustments to route 38 and transferring route 55 to a different operator. These sweeping changes and the resulting industrial friction caused significant disruption to local bus services, escalating into a high-profile crisis that sparked a heated parliamentary debate and an Early Day Motion tabled by local MPs who criticised the management strategy.


Bus Services Meeting Papers

A further issue concerns access to Bus Services Meeting Papers. These records are not routinely published alongside Board papers and are often only obtainable through a Freedom of Information request. This process remains potentially time-consuming for journalists and campaigners alike. Information that could easily be published directly on the TfL website for public convenience is instead only available through the FOI process. To ensure genuine operational transparency and accountability, TfL should automatically release the papers from the Bus Services Meetings, saving the need for the general public to submit formal FOI requests just to see how local networks are managed.

A clear administrative solution would be for these Bus Services Meetings to be published transparently on the TfL board website, alongside any other executive meetings currently not routinely published.

Accessibility and Accountability: TfL’s Advisory Panels Under the Spotlight

To ensure equality and inclusion across its network, TfL collaborates with various community organisations and distinct advisory groups. These include the Independent Disability Advisory Group (IDAG), a 13-member panel of experts with lived experience of disability who provide evidence-based strategic recommendations, and the TfL Youth Panel, which gives around 30 volunteers aged 16–25 a direct voice in policy and decision-making. Additionally, the Inclusive Transport Forum brings together accessibility advocates to offer insight into how TfL projects impact disabled passengers. However, transparency regarding these initiatives has faced hurdles; as seen on TfL's disclosure log, an FOI request had to be submitted by a member of the public to secure the release of the agenda papers for the IDAG meetings.

The Transparency Gap

While these panels represent a vital bridge between Londoners and policymakers, the necessity of legal mechanisms like FOI requests raises questions about proactive transparency. For an organisation that handles millions of journeys daily, the insights generated by groups like IDAG are crucial for public accountability.

Advocates argue that when the minutes and agendas of key inclusion panels are not routinely published, it limits the community's ability to scrutinise how public transport decisions are actually made. To fix this, TfL should proactively release all papers and agendas from the IDAG meetings alongside the Bus Services Meetings. Publishing these documents by default would improve transparency, strengthen public trust, and save the general public from submitting repetitive FOI requests to uncover essential accessibility data.

Solutions

Addressing these governance concerns will require concrete amendments to primary UK legislation, including the GLA Act 1999, to fundamentally reform and decentralise transport decision-making. We should look toward the American approach to holding public bodies to account, particularly those wielding vast regional transport powers. For example, the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) in New York City actively invites the general public and advocacy groups to submit comments directly at MTA board and committee meetings, which are live-streamed on YouTube and other social media platforms.

While TfL’s centralised decision-making structure remains a subject of governance debate, its proactive publication of data in many areas provides a strong foundation for reform. Adopting a similar open-mic format ahead of TfL board sessions could help ensure that an adequate number of local stakeholders could voice their concerns directly to decision-makers. One possible approach would be to adopt a more transparent and participatory model of governance. This could include TfL proactively publishing papers from Bus Services Meetings and the Independent Disability Advisory Group as part of its routine publication scheme. This change would uphold open transparency while saving the general public and campaign groups from having to navigate the bureaucratic FOI process.

Furthermore, this reform could include granting stronger oversight powers to the London Assembly, such as the authority to veto certain TfL initiatives in specified circumstances—particularly when a consultation report indicates that a clear majority of participants anticipate a negative impact from the proposed changes. This mechanism could serve to safeguard protected groups under the Public Sector Equality Duty of the Equality Act 2010, such as elderly or disabled passengers, whilst providing an additional democratic check on major policy shifts like road user charging expansions. Empowering the London Assembly in this manner would reduce the current reliance placed on campaign groups to seek Mayoral intervention or to incur the significant expenses associated with bringing a judicial review through the courts to challenge final decisions.

On a structural level, I have previously suggested a newly reformed transport authority with deep democratic outreach. This would involve subsuming the legacy railways of the former Network SouthEast area into an expanded network, requiring close statutory collaboration with regional administrative divisions in the Home Counties, such as Kent County Council and the upcoming Greater Essex Combined County Authority.

In tandem, reviving the geographic principles of the historic London Passenger Transport Area would drastically enhance cross-boundary bus services. This could be achieved by resurrecting the legacy of London Country bus services and Green Line express coach routes, alongside absorbing successful modern regional schemes like Fastrack in Kent Thameside into the main London Bus network.

This vision for democratic transport reform is not exclusive to London; it should serve as a template for other metropolitan areas across the UK and beyond. Regions like Greater Manchester, which already utilise a directly elected Mayor alongside bus franchising, as well as other areas adopting franchising or managing council-owned bus companies, would benefit from identical accountability frameworks.

To enact these sweeping changes, parliament must pass new primary legislation. A comprehensive reform bill would require majority approval in both the House of Commons and the House of Lords before receiving Royal Assent from the Monarch.

Public transport plays an important role in supporting the economy and enabling access to employment, education and public services. When booking a minicab, you simply state your current location and your destination, expecting a seamless journey; passengers may reasonably expect that same standard of user-centric design from public transport bodies. This is particularly crucial regarding physical accessibility, such as upgrading bus specifications to accommodate two wheelchair users simultaneously—a standard already successfully implemented outside London—alongside accelerating the rollout of step-free access and level boarding across the Tube and national rail stations. The ultimate goal of my website remains rooted in uncovering these insights, offering robust advice, and proposing democratic solutions to elevate public transport in London, across the United Kingdom and beyond.

I would like to extend an invite for you to follow me on X (formerly Twitter) for transport-related updates. You can find me by searching for @CLondoner92 or by clicking on the direct link to my X page here. I am also present on BlueSky and Mastodon. I look forward to connecting with you on these platforms. Thank you for your support.

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